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Abstract
 
The notion of a community of inquiry has been treated by many of its proponents as being
an exemplar of democracy in action. We argue that the assumptions underlying this view
present some practical and theoretical difficulties, particularly in relation to distribution of
power among the members of a community of inquiry. We identify two presuppositions in
relation to distribution of power that require attention in developing an educational model
that is committed to deliberative democracy: (1) openness to inquiry and readiness to reason,
and (2) mutual respect of students and teachers towards one another. Our contention is
that these presuppositions, presented as preconditions necessary to the creation of a community
of inquiry, are not without ideological commitments and dependent upon the ability of
participants to share power. Using group dynamic theories and the ideas of Hannah Arendt,
we argue that behaviours commonly interpreted as obstacles to dialogue or reflective inquiry
could provide opportunities for growth.
 
Keywords: community of inquiry, deliberative democracy, democratic education,
power, philosophy for children
 
Introduction
 
Consideration of the relationship between education and democracy is increasingly
permeating educational discourse. A significant development in the philosophy of
education is the community of inquiry; a pedagogical practice often touted as an
exemplar of democracy in action.
 
1
 
 The philosophical origins of this approach can
be found in the works of C. S. Pierce, and later extensively developed by Matthew
Lipman in philosophy for children.
 
2
 
 The community of inquiry has been treated by
many of its proponents as being invaluable for achieving desirable social and polit-
ical ends through educating for democracy. Underlying this view is the idea that
education should empower children to be thoughtful about the way they conduct
their lives, and that doing philosophy is essential for the achievement of that goal.
However, a classroom community of inquiry depends on the deliberative skills of its
members and their willingness to share ideas, time and power, despite conflicting
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interests, in the process of social inquiry. We argue that the assumptions underlying
the view of the community of inquiry as a democratic practice present some practical
as well as theoretical difficulties, particularly in relation to distribution of power
among the members of a community of inquiry.
One of the assumptions of this paper is that ‘representative and direct democracy
are too one-dimensional for complex societies with increased interdependencies
and technological mediation’ (Anttiroiko, 2003, p. 121). Hand-in-hand with this
assumption is that deliberation, as an essential social element of the democratic
process, needs to be given priority. A significant factor is that deliberation deter-
mines the quality of the decision-making processes, and thereby, the influence and
control citizens have over collective decisions (Uhr, 1998). A commitment to these
assumptions brings into question the connection between education and democracy.
As our concern is with the community of inquiry as a pedagogical practice we
explore its congruity with a deliberative conception of democracy.
We identify two presuppositions in relation to distribution of power, typically
presented as preconditions necessary to the creation of a community of inquiry:
(1) openness to inquiry and readiness to reason, and (2) mutual respect of students
towards one another, and students and teachers towards one another. Our conten-
tion is that these presuppositions are not without ideological commitments and
dependent upon the ability of participants to share power. While a commitment to
an egalitarian procedure cannot be overlooked as having educational value, its over-
emphasis in practice could jeopardize the sincerity of emotions and opinions expressed
by participants and block effective inquiry. Using group dynamic theories and the
ideas of Hannah Arendt, we argue that behaviours commonly interpreted as
obstacles to dialogue or reflective inquiry, e.g. inter-personal conflicts, domination
and coercion, or other actions indicating a reluctance to distribute power, could
provide opportunities for growth.
 
Two Forms of Democracy
 
Democracy could be characterised by two principles: (1) citizen control over public
decision-making, and (2) equality between citizens in the exercising of making
decisions. Measuring democracy’s progress in terms of these principles is no easy
matter, as the indicators that relate to governance, democratic processes and
citizenship are numerous. The United Nations and the International Institute
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) assume that the strength of
democracy in practice is the product of factors such as the effectiveness of
political institutions, the confidence of the citizens in government and public
institutions, and the degree of participation by citizens in civic and community life.
 
3
 
Both of these organisations make the assumption that representative government
and freely held elections at regular intervals are the hallmarks of democracy and that
without elections there is no democracy. But this view is seriously flawed. Western
representative systems of government concentrate power with parliament or
congress, and all but exclude citizens from direct decision-making and participation.
In a representative system,
 Communities of Inquiry
 
3
 
© 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2008 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
 
... power is concentrated on a small number of politicians and high-level
bureaucrats and citizen input into policy is minimal, political accountability
is low and elected representatives susceptible to vested interests, misconduct
and corruption. (Burgh, Field & Freakley, 2006, p. 91)
The general institutional characteristics and underlying assumptions about citizen-
ship typical of modern democracies have come under scrutiny.
 
4
 
 There seems to be
agreement among many commentators that ‘the premises of this hierarchical and
representative political system are crumbling, and we must seriously consider the
need to revitalise democracy’ (Anttiroiko, 2003, p. 121).
Democracy, according to John Dewey, ‘is more than a form of government, it is
primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint, communicated experience’
(1916, p. 87). Dewey’s vision of democracy is that of a strong democracy; a process
of community formation founded on deliberative communication. It is a delibera-
tive model of democracy that provides a vision of an ideal democratic society,
which supports greater participation and deliberation as necessary conditions for
democratic life. The fact that a genuine deliberative democracy does not as yet
exist should not be considered a hindrance. If we are ever going to achieve a
stronger democracy of the deliberative kind in what Dewey called the Great
Community we need to have microcosms in place. For Dewey the school is such a
place. In order to test his new educational theories and principles, he developed the
Laboratory School at the University of Chicago, which he described as a ‘miniature
community, an embryonic society’ consisting of an adult-child collective (1956,
p. 18). Dewey believed that the classroom should be a social enterprise in which
all children have the opportunity to contribute, and all are engaged in communal
projects.
Gutmann (1987) argues that Dewey’s characterisation of the school, i.e. as that
of a miniature democratic community, may be mistakenly understood as a well
developed public sphere in which all members equally participate and deliberate.
While the school’s internal democratic structures were more democratic than
almost all schools in the USA, it was an ‘embryonic democratic society because it
elicited a commitment to learning and cultivated the democratic virtues among its
students, not because it treated them as the political equals of its teachers’ (p. 93).
Gutmann argues that democratic schools need not be democratic in the same way
as democratic societies. Indeed, they cannot be, since schools by their very nature
also prepare students for democratic citizenship. Students cannot expect to have
the same citizenship rights as adults, but it would be inconsistent with democratic
practice if they were denied ‘both individual and collective influence in shaping
their own education’ (p. 94). While young children in particular are not ready for
full citizenship, they, like all students, have to be prepared for citizenship, or more pre-
cisely, 
 
practise citizenship
 
. For education to be not contrary to democratic practice,
a considerable degree of democracy within schools is desirable, if not necessary.
Just how much democracy is necessary requires further investigation, as there
is a lack of evidence for the impact of internal democracy on the cultivation of
participatory virtues among students (p. 92).
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Seeking a Model of Democratic Education
 
The importance of citizenship preparation as an integral component of schooling
cannot be denied if education is to make a contribution to the cultivation of
democratic competencies and values to enable civic participation. The overall goal
of civic participation ‘is for better decisions, supported by the public and fostering
the increased wellbeing of the population’ (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006,
p. 173). Civic participation can be described in two ways: (1) as collective and
individual activities reflecting interest and engagement with governance and
democracy, and (2) as the quality of the participation with regards to deliberative
processes and decision-making. A useful framework for assessing education with
regards to citizenship preparation according to the above measures is to distinguish
between education for democracy and democratic education (Burgh, 2003; Burgh,
Field & Freakley, 2006).
 
5
 
 Whereas education for democracy focuses on the acquisi-
tion of knowledge and skills as a means to improve the capacity of future citizens
to exercise competent autonomy, democratic education recognises the social role
of schooling as that of reconstruction and that children and young people have an
integral role to play in shaping democracy.
The primary goal of education for democracy is the achievement of an educated
citizenry competent to participate in democratic societies. Education for demo-
cracy is often introduced in schools as citizenship education during social studies
programs and focuses on political education or studies in civics. According to this view,
students will be adaptable and socially responsible contributors to the democratic
society in which they live if they acquire a thorough knowledge and understanding
of their country’s political heritage, democratic institutions and processes, systems
of government, the judicial system, and other aspects that will assist them to
become fully functioning citizens, such as how to register to vote. Much of what
we see as citizenship education has more-or-less elements such as these. Other
elements may include the exposure of students to concepts and values supposedly
necessary for democracy such as social justice, rights, equality, freedom, choice,
culture, identity, ecological and economic sustainability, and so forth, or involvement
of students in model procedures, such as classroom elections or mock parliaments.
To a large extent the assumption is that there is something, namely democracy, of
which we can attain knowledge. It is by-and-large a model of cultural transmission
whereby students take on board particular facts and apply these to their lives. It
does not prepare students for the central task of active citizenship and places ‘the
locus of decision making outside the realm of students’ rational deliberations’
(Weinstein, 1991, p. 10).
Education for democracy need not be limited to civics or citizenship education
that deals with the origins, structures and functions of democratic systems of
governance. Critical thinking approaches to educating for democracy have found
a place in the school curriculum. The aim of these approaches is to provide oppor-
tunities for students to critically evaluate the principles that underlie democratic
systems of governance. Rather than superficial discussion of particular facts,
emphasis is on the underlying concepts that those particular facts reflect. The basis
 Communities of Inquiry
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of this approach is to develop an active and informed citizenry able to participate
responsibly as members of their society. Some approaches expand on the notion of
critical thinking as a means for developing critical attitudes in students to articulate
and support their views, and to develop skills in problem-solving and decision-
making as future citizens. What is crucial is that education develops in students,
and in the population generally, a sufficient degree of social understanding and
judgement so that they have the capacity to think intelligently about public issues.
Whilst the promotion of intellectual development is not new, recent moves
toward a thinking oriented curriculum have placed the development of thinking at
the centre of education reforms. In particular, the emphasis is on higher-order
thinking skills. The failure of students to learn these skills has led to a rapid growth
in thinking skills programs aimed at developing students’ analytic and logical acumen.
It has also re-kindled an interest in the use of philosophical discussion as an
effective pedagogy for facilitating deeper learning and intellectual engagement. Not
surprisingly proponents of philosophy for children are eager to point to the merits
of philosophical inquiry in improving students’ thinking.
 
6
 
 But this narrow concep-
tion of philosophy as merely a thinking skills program is misleading, because ‘it
immediately marginalises the social, ethical, aesthetic, affective and political
components that are as integral to the teaching of thinking as the skills themselves’
(Splitter & Sharp, 1995, p. 3). While an adequate theory of education for democracy
must include a place for critical thinking, it would be a mistake to de-emphasise,
or to deny, the integral links between philosophy and democratic practice. To ignore
that a commitment to the community of inquiry is also a political commitment is
to ignore the relationship between thought and action. We will take up this issue
later in our discussion on the community of inquiry as a democratic practice.
How does democratic education differ from education for democracy? While the
primary goal of democratic education also is the achievement of an educated
citizenry its emphasis is not on promoting the competencies considered to be
necessary for flourishing in a pre-existing model of democracy. It recognises that
young people also have an integral role to play in 
 
shaping
 
 democracy, and that
democracy is an educational process and not something to educate toward. Two
models of democratic education have emerged, both rhetorically influential, but
limited in practice due to their seemingly incongruence with conventional methods
of schooling. One model emphasises self-regulation and progressivism, and the
other is concerned with communicative and deliberative capabilities.
The self-regulating model has mistakenly been identified with vulgar educational
or philosophical interpretations of progressivism. Progressivism in the USA, and
in many other countries, was discredited for being vague about the relationship
between democracy and educational methods, in particular ‘the process of upbring-
ing and teaching as an end in itself ’ (Englund, 2005, p. 136). However, it is more
accurate to describe this model as more closely linked to progressivism in the UK,
and in particular A. S. Neill’s renowned Summerhill School which is notable for
its application of the educational principles set out in Rousseau’s 
 
Emile
 
. Neill’s
Summerhill School exemplifies a very permissive self-governing school. He believed
that if students were given freedom and self-governance in relation to practices in
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school they would develop what he saw as good habits and demonstrate capabilities
to share responsibility for positive social reconstruction with adults. On this account of
democratic education schools must embody decision-making structures that facili-
tate and foster meaningful participation by all members of the school community,
which may lead to ongoing social reconstruction and change. Although, in practice,
restructuring efforts have been more rhetorical than real, this progressive model of
democratic education provides not only opportunities for students to participate in
decision-making, but also purports to enhance their ability to self-regulate their roles
within community life through learning and sharing. As the history of progressive
education has shown, some schools heavily emphasised social reform through stu-
dents’ participation in school-governance while others were less permissive, leaving
administration mainly to professionals with varying degrees of input from students
and parents.
Neill’s underlying claim that children ought to govern themselves, to be able to
learn or play at will, so that they will develop as far as they are capable of devel-
oping and share in the responsibility for social reconstruction, has been heavily
criticised. It is not evident that freedom and self-governance in relation to school
are sufficient to foster an educated citizenry competent to participate in democratic
societies. Speaking on the notion of participation in school governance generally,
Mark Weinstein (1991) argued that ‘children have neither the responsibility for
making actual school policy decisions, nor information and deliberative competence
adequate to the task’ (p. 16). According to Weinstein’s critique, expecting children
to participate and share the responsibility for school governance is thus ‘contrary
to the democratic principles of nondiscrimination and nonrepression’ (p. 16). Not
surprisingly, he recommends the development of communities of inquiry in the
classroom, whereby students learn deliberative strategies not through participation
in school-governance, but by focusing on issues in such a way that enables them
to prepare for sharing the responsibility of public deliberation and governance.
Accordingly, the second sense in which the term democratic education is used
refers to an education where communicative and deliberative capabilities and attitudes
are developed. Unlike the self-regulating model, this pragmatist account of demo-
cratic education recognises the importance of education as communication ‘where
different perspectives are brought into ongoing meaning-creating processes of will-
formation’ (Englund, 2005, p. 141). The community of inquiry provides a model
of democracy as inquiry, as well as being an educative process in itself, and as such
has much to offer with regards to democratic education. It is important to note
Dewey’s contribution to the formulation and evolution of this model of democratic
education, in particular the incorporation of practicality. According to Dewey, an
idea must be tested and final judgement withheld until it has been applied to the
situation or state of affairs for which it was intended. Through reflection and reasoned
judgement the consequences that ensue from the testing of ideas are evaluated, and
only then do the inquirers establish meaning. In other words, the practical testing
of ideas becomes an integral part of the inquiry process; it is essential for the
facilitation of the Deweyan ideals of thinking, community, autonomy, and democratic
citizenship that it intends to facilitate (Bleazby, 2006). Building on Dewey, Lipman
 Communities of Inquiry
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(2003) explains that the classroom community of inquiry is ‘the embryonic intersec-
tion of democracy and education,’ and ‘represents the social dimension of democratic
practice, for it both paves the way for the implementation of such practice and
is emblematic of what such practice has the potential to become’ (pp. 249–50).
However, the literature on philosophy for children can be regarded as vague on
the facilitation of practicality as an essential feature of the inquiry process itself.
To be effective, philosophy for children must integrate practical learning with
philosophical communal inquiry in order to facilitate learning outcomes that may
lead to social reconstruction.
Practical learning approaches vary, and might involve scientific experiments,
productive labour, or some kind of service learning, usually work experience or
community service activities. As we are concerned with the tie between education
and democracy our chief concern is with service learning.
Service learning usually involves students performing community service
activities primarily as a means to facilitating various learning outcomes.
However, in practice, many service learning programs fail to fully facilitate
the reflective, creative, caring and critical inquiry and disposition, and the
meaningful practice that they intend ... 
 
Social reconstruction learning
 
involves the identification of social problems in order to develop and
implement real solutions to them. (Bleazby, 2007, p. 1, emphasis added)
This account of practical learning as social reconstruction learning is congruent
with a pragmatist conception of the community of inquiry, which emphasises com-
municative and deliberative capabilities, and is consistent with Dewey’s conception
of communal inquiry as a process of constructing and applying ideas that aim at real
social change. Whereas Dewey argued that common and productive activity through
school occupations, properly used, connects students to the school curriculum and
engages them in social activities via firsthand experience, social reconstruction
learning incorporates student participation in community development projects
and other social and political activities to facilitate an understanding of the process
of self-governance, and therefore has the potential to bring about social change. By
applying their inquiry skills to actual situations students purposefully reconstruct
their socio-cultural environment (Bleazby, 2004).
Self-governance, as the term is used here in relation to social reconstruction, is
not to be confused with school-governance. Rather, it is engagement with the
design and implementation of solutions to social problems that affect not only the
members of the class, but also members of the greater community. In this sense
democratic education extends beyond the classroom and the school. Democratic
education requires members of the school community to understand the connec-
tion between themselves as active members of the community, the school of which
they are a part, the greater community and responsible decision-making. The
school and the community to which it belongs becomes a microcosm of a greater
deliberative democratic community.
We contend that a commitment to the pragmatist model of democratic education
and not merely education for democracy is required to bring about deliberative
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democracy.
 
7
 
 However, the pragmatist account rests on the notion of the community
of inquiry which itself rests on assumptions in relation to the distribution of power.
In the next section we argue that these assumptions present some practical and
theoretical difficulties, and identify ways of understanding the function of unbal-
anced manifestations of power.
 
The Community of Inquiry as a Deliberative Practice
 
Participation in a deliberative democracy requires a variety of skills, much more
than the skills required from a citizen in a liberal-democracy as practised in coun-
tries such as Australia, USA, UK, Canada and New Zealand. Among other things,
citizens are required to be able to use high order cognitive and social skills such as
reasoning, critical and creative thinking, willingness to self-correct opinions, and
openness to the opinions of others. Since these skills demand much practise it is
pertinent that young people be initiated into the practice of deliberative democracy
during their schooling years and learn to practise collaborative deliberation before
they join the public sphere as adult citizens (Gutmann, 1987; Lipman, 2003). In
addition, it should not be overlooked that democratic education initiates students
to the political aspects of democracy, which Dewey, recall, described as 
 
a mode of
associated living
 
. According to Sharp,
the commitment to engage in a community of inquiry is a political
commitment even in the elementary school level. In a real sense, it is a
commitment to freedom, open debate, pluralism, self government and
democracy ... It is only to the extent that individuals have had the
experience of dialoguing with others as equals, participating in shared,
public inquiry that they will be able to eventually take an active role in
the shaping of a democratic society. (Sharp, 1993, p. 343)
Understanding the community of inquiry as a political process draws attention to
the implication of power and its distribution among members of a classroom
community of inquiry. Power, as defined here, is the ability of individuals and groups
to influence the process of resource allocation to secure their particular and sub-
jective interests (Lukes, 1986, 2005). In a deliberative community, such as the
community of inquiry attempts to cultivate, the resources available to the members
are time and ideas. These resources influence the outcomes of collaborative inquiry
and as a result shape the individual and the collective habits of the community
members. Because these resources and their distribution influence the result of
the inquiry process and therefore carries implications of social reconstruction, a
necessary requirement is that these resources be distributed as equally as possible
to facilitate dialogue before any collective understanding is reached. However, the
promise of building a community of inquiry in a classroom environment can be
overshadowed by problems encountered in the classroom.
An overview of the literature reveals a generally optimistic view of the educa-
tional potential of the community of inquiry but does not take to task the promise
that students 
 
will
 
 be philosophically open or eager to engage in inquiry. Some of
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the literature tackles the problem of potential obstacles to a community of inquiry,
but discussion is usually devoted to searching for causes and remedies for reluctant
or disruptive students.
 
8
 
 Wendy Turgeon (1998) examines three possible causes for
what she calls the recalcitrant classroom: (1) because philosophy’s task is to ques-
tion our most cherished beliefs, ‘[t]he accepted way of viewing the world, the very
foundations of a student’s contextual map, is threatened,’ (2) students may see
‘philosophizing as a waste of time on the grounds that it is simply a matter of
opinion, personal taste, choice and therefore not an issue for real disagreement or
debate,’ and (3) students have come to the conclusion that ‘education is by nature
a divisive and hostile one’ (p. 10). Mostly, the remedies suggested rely on techniques
for moving beyond hostility towards philosophy, such as: encouraging students to
give education a chance, the use of activities to invite students to examine their
own beliefs, activities to promote dialogue or focus on community.
Turgeon recognises that there are other interpretations of students’ hostility
towards philosophy. Students may have personal reasons (e.g. social dynamics such
as inter-personal conflict) or deep seated reasons (e.g. problems or crises at home)
for not actively participating in a community of inquiry (p. 11). She points out that
some of these problems can be effectively facilitated within the classroom community.
Before one can do philosophy, one must have the sense that one’s ideas
will be listened to, taken seriously, and respectfully responded to. This
does not mean that you must have a fully developed community of
inquiry as a pre-requisite for doing philosophy but it does point to the
important need to focus on the nature of community and its importance
in knowledge building from the start. (Turgeon, 1998, p. 14)
Turgeon’s response reiterates those in the vast amounts of literature on building
a community of inquiry. So too is the pairing of philosophical inquiry with the tech-
niques of conflict resolution promoted in the educational and psychological literature,
such as games, role playing, and shared activities in order to encourage community
of inquiry building (Redshaw, 1994). Yet, Turgeon cautions, we cannot rely solely
on these as remedies as ‘there remain distinct aspects of the philosophical community
of inquiry to which we must be alert to develop and maintain’ (1998, p. 14).
If we accept that there are many reasons why students are not always philosophic-
ally open and eager to engage in inquiry, then we need more than a promise that
philosophical inquiry can provide them with the tools to challenge their attitudes,
values, beliefs or conceptions, and to encourage them to ask questions which can
be used as a basis for inquiry and the development of community. This concern is
further highlighted when taking into account not just the doubts, concerns, and
misgivings expressed by the participants, but also the power structures that govern
their lives and the ways in which these manifest in the classroom.
 
Sharing Power
 
9
 
Despite efforts by Turgeon and others to explain the dilemma of the reluctant or
disruptive student their explanations rely on an assumption that members of the
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community could develop the ability to inquire together while refraining from
behaviours that abuse their personal power, such as dominating the inquiry process
and practising coercion on the community, even in situations of conflict. However,
it is not clear how dispositions towards sharing power necessarily develop in the
course of the inquiry process. This prevalent assumption overlooks the possibility
that sharing power, opinions, and other resources could cause strong emotional
responses, which are often manifested as resistance, among participants in a com-
munity of inquiry. For example, certain members who are prone to silence or who
dominate discussion might not be receptive to changing their patterns of behaviour.
This possibility is clear from Sharp’s (1993, pp. 338–40) description of a well
functioning as opposed to blocked inquiry: In a well functioning community of
inquiry participants move from considering themselves and their accomplishments
as all important. They become conscious of other members’ contributions and allow
themselves to transform themselves, eventually becoming part of an interdependent
whole. However, in order for this to happen, trust and care of the community
must be in place. The absence of care and trust often result in a blocked inquiry
in which some members are overpowered by fear and other emotions that keep
them from sharing their views and ideas with the community. According to Sharp,
this is a sign that something is very wrong.
Sharp’s explanation of blocked inquiry as an indication that something is very
wrong assumes that emotions which keep participants from sharing their views and
ideas with the community should always be couched in terms of a potential obstacle
to a community of inquiry. But behaviours typically seen as blocked inquiry could
also provide opportunities for growth. These opportunities rely on attributing
emotional states to the community, which reveal the level of trust and caring
relationship the group shares, and influence its ability, or inability, to advance
further towards the goal of becoming egalitarian and democratic. More insightful,
therefore, is the following comment by Turgeon:
Paradoxically we might also re-examine the whole dilemma of the
recalcitrant classroom as a sign of health, rather than as something that
must be ‘fixed’ or eliminated. Perhaps such conflicts and protestations
against philosophy reveal a more honest engagement within the classroom
than is generally found in the traditional room. (Turgeon, 1998, p. 14)
The suggestion is that the community of inquiry exposes student’s motivation or
lack of it. While detection of students’ reluctance to engage in dialogue or to
participate in a community should be a direct consideration, the matter of how to
facilitate the growth of all participants once such behaviour has been recognised
still remains.
Group dynamic theories offer a way of understanding the function of conflict and
unbalanced manifestations of power and how these contribute to the emotional life
of a group, including a well functioning classroom community practising collective
inquiry. The rationale behind group dynamic theories is that the emotional life of
a group, sometimes expressed as domination of the inquiry process by individual
members, present valuable clues for possibilities of further progress and growth
 Communities of Inquiry
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(Bion, 1961; Rioch, 1970; Smith & Berg, 1987). By focusing on the emotional
state of the community as a whole, and accepting that unequal sharing of power
could be understood as the community’s way of signalling their own needs and
solutions for conducting collective inquiry, facilitators are able to establish trust
and care based on its members fashion of sharing power.
Group dynamic theories were influenced by the work of Wilford Bion who claimed
that members of a group function simultaneously as members of (1) a rational and
task oriented working group, and (2) an emotional unconscious basic assumption
group (Bion, 1961; Rioch, 1970). Whereas the rational and task oriented working
group is composed of cooperative members who constantly test the conclusions
they establish in an intelligent matter, seek knowledge, learn from experience, and
question how they may best achieve their goals, the emotional unconscious basic
assumption group operates differently beneath the surface (Rioch, 1970, p. 58).
All groups alternate between rational and task oriented behaviour and emotional
ineffective and resistant behaviour. The latter, Bion claims, is characterised by tacit
assumptions: dependency, fight or flight, and paring,
 
10
 
 one of which the group
unconsciously shares as a whole, and which provide the emotional foundation for
the group’s behaviour (Rioch, 1970).
When occupying roles in the emotional unconscious basic assumption group,
members tend to be influenced by emotional states, such as anxiety and shame,
which resist learning and change. These emotional states, shared by the group as
a whole, cannot be attributed or explained in terms of individual members’ behav-
iour, even if particular members seem to lead the group’s resistance. There is a
kind of conspiracy of anonymity among the group members and no individual
participant is willing to accept ownership for such behaviour. However, certain
members accept roles, such as the leader, the clown and the troublemaker in basic
assumption groups, usually due to personal valency.
 
11
 
 These roles represent the
vicarious aspect of the group’s life, in which certain individuals become fixed in
roles that the group needs for its own purposes (Rioch, 1970, p. 62). This aspect
of group life can be understood by the mechanism of projective identification,
which is salient as long as the group operates as a basic assumption group (Wells,
1980). Projective identification is an unconscious mechanism that describes the
emotional interdependence developed among the group members in the course of
their collective inquiry.
 
12
 
 As long as the projective identification mechanism is
sustained the group feels secure and successfully refrains from dealing with its
emotional threats by consciously discussing and inquiring about them. The group
seems ineffective, and the inquiry process cannot proceed (Wells, 1980).
Group dynamic theories do not treat the group’s ineffectiveness when under the
basic assumption state as a threat to the groups’ ability to continue their cognitive
work. On the contrary, these emotional states and mechanisms provide opportuni-
ties for the group members to continue their inquiry process. Basic assumptions
contain defence mechanism which allow groups, on the one hand, to continue the
inquiry in accordance with the members’ emotional abilities, and on the other
hand, to identify perceived threats and slowly subject them to conscious delibera-
tion by bringing these threats to the group’s attention in a manner which they
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could handle. According to Bion, consistent interpretation of the basic assumption
tendencies will gradually bring them into consciousness and cause them to lose
their threatening quality (Rioch, 1970, p. 64).
Interpreting the community’s emotional states, sometimes manifested by domin-
ant members’ attempts to coerce and block the inquiry process, is the missing link
in Sharp’s description of the necessary tension between vitality and form in a
successful community of inquiry.
[W]hen a creative tension exists among participants a tension between
vitality and of the many relationships and the form of the community of
inquiry, the group has the potential for open debate, growth and each
participant has the potential for self-transformation. Because tension is
painful, we tend to get rid of it at any cost. Often we find ourselves instead a
mere form of communal inquiry. The purpose, however, of a community
of inquiry is to restore the tension between vitality and form, to bring
participants into deeper and more significant relationships, to shake them
free of their complacency, their false convictions and to make them
available for more comprehensive understandings. Therefore, it follows
that dis-logical thinking within the community requires a willingness to
be disturbed and to be challenged by the ideas of the other, a process of
active reconstruction using criteria of comprehensiveness, coherence and
consistency, together with sensitivity to the particularity of each situation.
(Sharp, 1993, p. 340)
Sharp’s claims suggest that pre-set values, such as subjecting the inquiry to cogni-
tive deliberation and cognitively dealing with emotional and painful experiences at
all costs, must direct the successful practice of the community of inquiry. However,
this seems to contradict the theoretical foundations of the community of inquiry
itself, namely that the community must rely on its own particular intelligent resources
for identifying new opportunities for betterment. Thus, emotional resources, as well
as different solutions for organizing the political life of the community, presented
sometimes as group members’ insistence to dominate discussion, must be considered
equally legitimate in the inquiry process. These intelligent solutions and resources
are valuable for the community’s wellbeing and progress and cannot be determined
in advance over and above the participants’ own conflicts, interests and choices.
We contend, therefore, that the values of equal participation and non-domination,
understood as equal sharing of power among the community’s members, should be
also subjected to inquiry and reconsideration, and that behaviours that seem to
contradict these values be considered, as Turgeon recommends, as evidence for
honest and engaged involvement by students in a painful process of social recon-
struction which may carry practical implications. Emotional states and defence
mechanisms are resources that should be taken into consideration and assist each
community to develop, deliberate and reconstruct social arrangements according
to the participants’ own abilities and pace.
Nancy Vansieleghem (2005) claims that philosophical inquiry with children should
provide a space where children can encounter each other and examine new possibilities
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for understanding these encounters. Following Hannah Arendt, she suggests that it
is precisely the newness or natality which each child brings into the world by being
born that makes such new understandings of social relations possible. Thus, the
community of inquiry as a democratic practice must allow the newness in children
to influence inquiry by refraining from presenting the world as fixed and determined
by egalitarian attitudes toward democracy, deliberation and power. Vansieleghem’s
claim points to the importance of allowing children to influence the process of the
community of inquiry with insights that were not imagined by Lipman and other
proponents of philosophy for children. Such insights can be imagined by children
because their experiences of the world are new and different from those of adults.
This outlook, influenced by Arendt’s ideas, stretches the previous argument further,
and suggests that emotional states prevalent in the community of inquiry as a whole
could be understood also as evidence of originality and creativity in children. Such
originality provides sound reasons for understanding power relations in the com-
munity of inquiry differently than prevalently assumed by its proponents.
Arendt uses the concept of natality, which is rooted in the human condition, to
describe the potential for renewal that every birth of a child brings into the world.
Unlike preserving life, which is a process doomed to decay with life itself, human
action introduces new words and deeds into our common world and in turn trans-
forms and rescues it from destruction. This ability to change the common world is
preserved by natality. Since newcomers are constantly introduced into the world,
each different and unique, they are capable of beginning something new; to think
of new initiatives and to introduce these into the world. The newcomers by birth,
strangers to the world’s ways, are themselves new beginnings by virtue of being
born, since their future cannot be restricted by the old world to which they were
born (Arendt, 1998; Levinson, 2001). Once newcomers develop and join the com-
mon world as free agents they can set it anew. The newcomers are the world’s hope
for political change. Accordingly, if natality is lost, the public realm collapses as
well. Human life on earth cannot develop by natural historical processes alone.
Human life depends on renewal, which springs out of people living together and
influencing their common world with their words and deeds. This renewal is
secured by the constant flux of newcomers by birth into the world. Therefore, the
newness of these newcomers should be cultivated (Arendt, 1998).
Arendt argues against any attempt to apply political ideas, such as equality in
power to the pre-political or semi-private sphere of education. Students’ indi-
viduality springs from the condition of plurality in the world. Each new child is
different and unpredictable and must be acknowledged as such. The conditions of
plurality and natality, once matured in students, could influence our common
world in ways yet to be determined as well as shape a democratic public sphere in
which individuals contribute their individual words and deeds to group power, and
together generate ideas that may transcend their creators existence and stay in our
common world as immortal traditions for future generations to set anew further
with their own natality. Power, generated by communicative efforts between indi-
viduals gathered to deliberate about their common world, constantly sets the world
anew and changes political reality in a process that cannot be predicted and which
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depends on human agency alone. This understanding allows free agents as well as
young students to participate and influence the common world. The community of
inquiry, therefore, should welcome such manifestations of newness and communica-
tive power. If students are given the opportunity to experiment with their natality
and if allowed to mature as political agents they could influence our common world
with new understandings of power and freedom in ways that could not have been
foreseen.
 
Conclusion
 
Democratic education can be seen as a co-operative means of raising the level of social
and political participation through deliberative practices and as a way of creating a
link for students between inquiry in the classroom and deliberative decision-making
and social reconstruction in society. The rhetoric of democracy recognises diversity,
pluralism, and multiculturalism. These elements are part of everyday contemporary
life which means conflicts will inevitably persist. It is, therefore, necessary that
educators ensure that students acquire the necessary skills for conflict resolution.
The community of inquiry, when used both as a way of fostering democratic character,
and as a process for participating in self-governance, helps students to understand
and deal with the problems that face modern societies.
In order to develop a practical understanding of conflict resolution students must
have an understanding of power. We have argued that while the community of inquiry
should strive to achieve full and equal distribution of power among its members,
as an educational pedagogy its task is also to emancipate children. In order to achieve
this we must allow their natality, as an opportunity to introduce new ideas into our
common world and set it anew, by facilitating their philosophical inquiry but
refraining from framing the results of the process and the future with our own
ideological commitments and preconceived notions of inquiry. Democratic educa-
tors must trust the ability of students to introduce new ideas into communal life;
not as self-regulation exemplified by Neill’s Summerhill School, but through dialogue
in a community of inquiry committed to natality and social reconstruction, and
sensitivity to students’ emotional capabilities of advancing and exploring their
newness.
When faced with students who are generally antagonistic towards collaborative
inquiry, the task of engaging them in philosophical inquiry is undeniably an issue
not easily dealt with, perhaps even an impossible one. It would be a mistake to
think otherwise. Our task was to problematise the goals and methods of the
community of inquiry within the classroom, in particular to question the litera-
ture which promises that students will be philosophically open to engage in inquiry.
The community of inquiry can work quite well in classrooms where students are
favourably disposed to the notion of collaborative inquiry. It also has the potential
to be a viable option even in cases where students may enjoy exercising power within
the classroom by being deliberately disruptive and very reluctant to give this up.
However, it must be recognised that the source of such behaviour, e.g. suspicion,
mistrust, fear, and even hostility, pose challenges to the idea that solutions are best
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found in resolving differences through dialogue, facilitation and community build-
ing. Resolution of the problems facing teachers in the classroom with regard to
blocked inquiry in some cases can occur only in the larger social context. To
recognise that students bring power-related behaviours to the classroom, which can
act as potential obstacles to inquiry, requires pedagogic action on the part of the
teacher. The community of inquiry is an effective pedagogy that is distinct from
other learning styles, activities and teaching methodologies, in that it has a philo-
sophical focus. However, its effectiveness is dependent on the ways in which teachers
understand and deal with power and the distribution of power as a resource.
 
Notes
 
1. See Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980; Lipman, 1988, 2003.
2. What is often referred to as the philosophy for children movement is also variously
known as 
 
philosophy in schools
 
, 
 
philosophy with children, 
 
and 
 
philosophical inquiry in the
classroom
 
. These terms can be somewhat confusing as the methods that underpin
philosophy for children also have been adapted for use in the tertiary classroom and
elsewhere. What the ‘movement’ has in common is that it belongs to the tradition of
reflective education, but what distinguishes it from other approaches to education that
employ philosophy as a method for teaching and learning is that it is grounded in
Lipman’s classroom pedagogy and Deweyan educational theory and practice. Note that
the term philosophy for children and its cognate terms do not apply to 
 
Socratic Dialogue
 
developed by the German philosopher Leonard Nelson and later by his student Gustav
Heckmann or other approaches that teach Socratically or that use philosophy as a
method for teaching and learning. For a discussion on the different approaches to
teaching or using philosophy see: Davey, 2004; Murris & Haynes, 2001; Curnow, 2001;
Fisher, 1995.
3. Since 1990 the United Nations has published ‘The Human Development Report’. It
includes a range of indicators to measure the progress of democracy. The Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) has developed a framework for democratic
assessment. The information gathered by the Human Development Report and the
framework developed by IDEA are used in order to support sustainable democracy.
4. The institutional characteristics of modern democracies are usually expressed as:
representative government, free and fair elections at regular and frequent intervals, and
the ideas of mandate and merit as rationales for governance. Citizenship is typically
viewed as a legal status bound up in pre-political notions of liberty, the private domain,
and consumer rights, to the neglect of the public sphere as the location of citizenship.
5. Peters (1966) also deals extensively with the relationship between democracy and
education. He offers three ways in which education could be democratic: (1) the
democratization of education, (2) the school as a democratic institution, and (3)
education for democracy.
6. The philosophy for children movement is multi-faceted and has been interpreted in a
variety of ways. In particular it has been aligned with the critical thinking movement,
which itself is multi-faceted. This association has had some negative effects. Foremost is the
view that the community of inquiry is no more than a method to improve thinking.
7. See also Burgh, 2003; Burgh, Field & Freakley, 2006, esp. ch. 5.
8. See for example: Splitter & Sharp, 1995; de Haan 
 
et al
 
., 1995; Turgeon. 1998; Freakley
& Burgh, 2000; Burgh, Field & Freakley, 2006.
9. The argument presented in this section is an abridged version and appears in a
somewhat different form as part of an extended argument on the community of inquiry
as a democratic practice. See Yorshansky, 2007.
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10. Paring (or pairing) is characterised by a shared fantasy that at least two individuals will
work together to be innovative and give birth to renewed energy within the group,
characterised by feelings of hope, optimism, confidence and self-assurance that
undermine a group’s ability to think and act rationally (Paul
 
 et al
 
., 2002).
11. According to Bion, every individual has a tendency to enter into group life, especially
the irrational and unconscious aspects of group life, with certain tendencies—valencies.
Different and various levels of such valencies, influence the roles that individuals may
adopt while participating in the emotional lives of basic assumption groups (Rioch,
1970, p. 63).
12. For an extended discussion on projective identification, see Yorshansky, 2007.
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